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I. INTRODUCTION
IPOs are about information. The policy goal is reasonably clear: to
encourage the efficient flow of information so that the cost of capital for
growth companies is low.' Investors must be able to find out information
about the issuers. For lawyers involved in the deal-making process,
information costs are a familiar key transaction cost to be overcome.
2
But IPOs pose a special kind of information problem: they pose an
intelligence problem. The Internet has decreased search costs-the costs of
acquiring information.3 But the Internet has not, and cannot, solve the
intelligence problem. If anything, it may make things worse-or at least
pose some new challenges. a
The Internet makes it easier to acquire information and access markets,
but it does not necessarily improve the quality of information. For that, we
need good intelligence. And good intelligence comes from people, not
technology. That's what I want to talk about today.
II. PUZZLES AND MYSTERIES
In an IPO, the issuer starts with all the information: information about
the company, its managers, its products, its strategy for growth, its financial
history, and so on. Before investors put money into a company, they need
5that information about the company. As a result, issuers need to find a way
to feed information to investors. There is an information gap between the
issuer and the investors, and it can be a little scary to cross. I want to "mind
the gap" and focus in on this information gap between buyer and seller.6
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Another way to think about this gap is as an information asymmetry
between issuer and investor. The issuer has superior knowledge of its
financial information, strategic plans, management talent, and all of this
information has to get from the issuer to the investors for the IPO to work.
How exactly does this happen? It's a bit of a black box.
Regulators help define the shape of the box.8 They limit the kind
and amount of information that companies disclose, setting boundaries on
what is permissible and impermissible disclosure at certain times. In some
ways the government fills the box by forcing disclosure, but to a great
extent it merely coordinates the form in which that information is
disclosed. 9
To a large extent, then, we rely on the private market to generate
the information that must flow to investors. But how do we know if it's the
right amount of information? If markets function imperfectly, or if
regulators force too much disclosure, or the wrong kind of disclosure, we
might end up with too little information, or too much information, or
useless information that crowds out good information. We certainly don't
know for sure if we have "intelligent" information-the key information
that allows investors to price securities efficiently.' 0 Still, this is a problem
that we must tackle. One of the most important questions in finance is
encouraging the efficient flow of information for new issuers, as getting it
right means that we are lowering the cost of capital for growth companies.
It is, in other words, the engine that spurs innovation.
But how do we go about gathering good intelligence on any sort of
problem? I want to emphasize today that it's not just about gathering
information, but the quality of the information gathered. And the Internet
cannot help us with that as much as one might think.
For inspiration on this question I turn to one of my heroes, Malcolm
Gladwell. Gladwell wrote a piece in the New Yorker about Enron recently.
The article, titled Open Secrets, talks about why Enron was so overpriced."'
Gladwell argues that the conventional wisdom about Enron has it wrong.
Enron wasn't overpriced because it didn't disclose enough information
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about what it was doing.' 2  It failed because there was too much
information, and Wall Street failed to focus on what was important. 13
Gladwell drew a distinction between puzzles and mysteries. A
puzzle is where you "don't have enough information."' 4 You need a little
more information to solve it, one last piece of the puzzle. Tenacity is
important. A mystery, on the other hand, is where you have too much
information. 5 To solve a mystery, you have to sift through lots of red
herrings, look for clues, and deduce an answer. Intelligence is the key.
Enron, Gladwell argued, wasn't a puzzle; "It was a mystery.', 16 it
wasn't a problem of too little information. There was too much
information.' Enron was overhyped by the media, overhyped by analysts,
and the noise in the data overwhelmed investors. Enron became a "faith"
stock-a stock you bought not based on evidence, but because you believed
in the idea.18 Was Gladwell right? What was happening in the black box
between Enron and its investors? Is the black box a mystery, rather than a
puzzle? The answer is complicated. It's complicated whether Gladwell is
right or not because the information inside the black box is complicated.
It's not easy to interpret. Of course, the answer is that Enron was both a
puzzle and a mystery. There was too much information. But there was also
a problem with the quality of the information. There was bad information;
information was selectively disclosed; and it was selectively listened to.
As Jonathan Macey noted, there's plenty of blame to go around for
Enron.19 We can heap some on Wall Street for its failure to process the
available information, and there's still plenty of blame left for the auditors,
the lawyers, the managers, and even the investors themselves.
In a prior essay on Enron I tried to note that while information about the
gap between Enron's taxable income and accounting income was easy to
observe, the source of it was not.20 Enron's income could be low because it
was investing in research and development assets, or because of regulatory
12 Id. at 46.
" Id. at 46-50.14 Id. at 44-46.
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gamesmanship. To figure that out, you need a different skill set than what
most financial analysts use in valuing securities. While the capital markets
are efficient at pricing many different kinds of business risks, I'm less
convinced that they are very good at accounting for legal risk, regulatory
risk, or regulatory gamesmanship.
21
Return to the IPO question. What happens in the black box? Is
there too little information for investors, or too much? Is it a puzzle or a
mystery? Or is it both? How can we improve not just the amount of
information, or access to the information, but the quality of the
information?
Let's consider what we know about intelligence gathering more
broadly. We tend to overvalue intelligence that is gathered covertly; the
search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq reminded us that covert
intelligence isn't necessarily the most reliable information.22 Rather, one of
the most important intelligence functions is processing the information
that's out in the open.
The Internet, of course, is great at gathering large amounts of
information; search costs have dropped dramatically. The key promise of
the Internet when it comes to capital markets, as with other markets, is
disintermediation. Whether an information seeker wants to find a mate, a
book, an airline ticket, a house, a movie to watch or a blog to read, the
Internet makes it easier for that to happen without the seeker's paying a
substantial fee to an intermediary.
Decreasing search costs is what Google is all about, and as I wrote
in Brand New Deal, it made perfect sense for Google to do its IPO in a
different way.23 Google took information about the company, and rather
than place the stock through intermediaries through a book-building
24process, the price and allocation were determined by auction. Google
thought that this would lead to great efficiency as the market of
disintermediated buyers would discover the right price.25
But it's not so clear that it worked out this way. In the frenzy
leading up to the IPO, there may have been too much information, not too
little. The stock was almost certainly underpriced, jumping 18% on the first
day and another 300% that year.2 6 The first really big Internet auction
failed to convey information to investors in the most efficient manner.
21 See Victor Fleischer, The MasterCard lPO: Protecting the Priceless Brand, 12
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 137, 152-55 (2007).
22 See Gladwell, supra note 11, at 44.
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Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1600-06 (2006).24 See id. at 1598.
25 See generally Christine Hurt, What Google Can't Tell Us About Internet Auctions
(And What It Can), 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 403 (2006).
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21As I've argued elsewhere, 2 in the case of Google the structure can
still be defended on efficiency grounds by looking at the branding value of
the deal structure-the message conveyed to consumers. But the takeaway
lesson in considering information costs is that the magic of the market is
limited. Allowing numerous individual buyers to bid on the stock didn't
produce an efficient pricing of the stock, just as the market didn't efficiently
price Enron stock until the very end.
III. CONCLUSION: INTERMEDIARIES IN A WORLD OF CHEAP
INFORMATION
No matter how cheap information gets, we will still need
intermediaries. Issuers will always need to rent the reputation of
underwriters and lawyers, and investors will need guidance from analysts or
other intermediaries.2  It's not that these intermediaries have more
information, but rather that their skill sets turn raw information into
information one can intelligently act on. It's not the most informed but
rather the most intelligent investors who can become opinion leaders,
finding the best opportunities and setting market trends.
In sum, the Internet has driven down the cost of acquiring
information in every facet of life. In some transactional contexts
intermediaries aren't as necessary as they used to be. But disintermediation
brings with it the risk of too much information; bad information driving out
the good; noise crowding out the useful information in the data. In the IPO
context, we will continue to need strong, conflict-free gatekeepers-
analysts, lawyers, underwriters, auditors-to help investors process the
information. And regulators, too, will need to help coordinate the
production of information in a disintermediated world.
The Internet can help investors find information, covertly and
overtly, about the companies they want to invest in. But it cannot make
investors intelligent. Technology isn't intelligent; people are.
21 See id. at 1600.
21 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 605, 620-21.
2008]

